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ABSTRACT 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) is working to establish an organic 
special operations air wing.  This includes a full program implementation of policy and 
standards development, manning, training, basing, and aircraft procurement and 
sustainment. 
 This project addresses the issue of rotary aircraft procurement and sustainment.  
Building upon prior research conducted by NSHQ, it analyzes the previously 
recommended course of action of seeking an Excess Defense Article (EDA) grant of six 
SH-60s from the U.S. DoD.  It compares the EDA SH-60 option with procurement of 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) LAKOTA aircraft.  It also compares the 
establishment of organic NATO maintenance and logistics support capability with the 
option for Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) available with COTS LAKOTA 
procurement.  The primary consideration in this analysis is life cycle cost, though 
qualitative considerations of ease of program implementation and sustainment are also 
considered.   
The conclusion is made that COTS LAKOTA procurement with a CLS package is 
likely to be less expensive and easier for NATO to implement and manage than EDA SH-
60s with associated organic maintenance and logistics support. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................3 
A. NATO’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL 
FORCES ...........................................................................................................3 
B. NATO SOF AS A COMBINED STRATEGIC ASSET ...............................4 
C. THE NEED FOR AVIATION SOF CAPABILITY IN NATO ...................7 
D. SOF AIR MISSIONS AND REQUIRED SKILL SETS .............................11 
E. NATO SOF CHALLENGES UNDER THE CURRENT 
STRUCTURE .................................................................................................12 
F. THE PRIMACY OF SOF PERSONNEL OVER EQUIPMENT ..............14 
G. AIRFRAME SELECTION ...........................................................................17 
H. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES ..............................................................18 
1. UH-72A LAKOTA .............................................................................19 
2. SH-60F SEAHAWK...........................................................................22 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................25 
A. AIRCRAFT CHOSEN FOR ANALYSIS: SH-60, EC-145, MI-17 ...........25 
B. DATA ASSESSED AND SELECTED FOR USE .......................................27 
C. QUANTITATIVE (I.E., COST) ANALYSIS ..............................................28 
1. The Full NAVAIR EDA Program Startup Estimate: .....................29 
2. Comparison of “Free” SH-60s to EC-145 LAKOTA Variants 
over a Twenty-Year Period ...............................................................29 
D. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ........................................................................31 
IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS .................................................................................33 
A. PURCHASE PRICE, ANNUAL COST, AND LIFE CYCLE COST 
OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................36 
B. SH60 COSTED OPTION ..............................................................................37 
C. SH60 FREE AND LAKOTA 20-YEAR COST COMPARISON ..............38 
D. COSTS CONSIDERED WITH A PROGRAM END DATE OF 2019 .....41 
V. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ....................................................................................43 
A. PLATFORMS ................................................................................................43 
B. CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT ..................................................46 
C. THE MI-17 (EXPORT VERSION OF THE MI-8 HIP) ............................51 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................55 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................55 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................56 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .........................56 
APPENDIX. NAVAIR SH-60 COST ESTIMATES ...........................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................75 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................79 
 viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. UH-72A LAKOTA ..........................................................................................19 
Figure 2. UH-72A LAKOTA Port Aspect Overview......................................................20 
Figure 3. UH-72A LAKOTA Starboard Aspect Overview .............................................21 
Figure 4. SH-60F Illustration ..........................................................................................23 
Figure 5. SH-60F Photograph .........................................................................................23 
Figure 6. Comparison of Cumulative Costs ....................................................................37 
Figure 7. 20-Year Cumulative Costs ...............................................................................38 
Figure 8. Cumulative Cost of Six EDA 60s Followed by LAKOTA Replacement at 
a Rate of Two Aircraft Per Year ......................................................................40 
Figure 9. Cumulative Cost of Six EDA 60s Followed by LAKOTA Replacement at 
a Rate of One Aircraft Per Year .......................................................................41 
Figure 10. LUH Attributes ................................................................................................45 
Figure 11. U.S. Army Hybrid CLS Work Structure for the LUH .....................................50 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Comparative Aircraft Performance Data. ........................................................24 
Table 2. Aircraft Inventory Using the Rapid Replacement Schedule ............................30 
Table 3. Aircraft Inventory Using the Gradual Replacement Schedule ........................30 
Table 4. NAVAIR Costs for Grant of Six EDA SH-60s (2009 $s) ...............................33 
Table 5. Summary of Cost Data .....................................................................................35 
Table 6. Annual Cost of Full Program Startup using EDA SH-60s (BY2011) .............37 
Table 7. Annual Costs ....................................................................................................38 
Table 8. Rapid Replacement: Two LAKOTAs/year beginning 2014 ............................39 
Table 9. Gradual Replacement: One LAKOTA/year beginning 2015...........................40 
Table 10. Hybrid CLS Performance ................................................................................48 
Table 11. Full CLS Performance .....................................................................................48 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACT   Allied Command Transformation 
APUC   Average Procurement Unit Cost 
C4I   Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
CLS   Contractor Logistics Support 
COTS   Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
DA   Direct Action 
DAMIR  Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
DLR   Depot Level Repairable 
EDA   Excess Defense Articles 
EU   European Union 
GSBPP  Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
JSOU   Joint Special Operations University 
LOA   Letter of Agreement 
LUH   Light Utility Helicopter 
MA   Military Assistance 
MEP(s)  Mission Essential Package(s) 
MFP   Multiple Futures Project 
MTTR   Mean Time To Repair 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVAIR  Naval Air Systems Command 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
NSHQ   NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters 
NSSC   NATO Special Operations Coordination Center 
NVG   Night Vision Goggle 
O&S   Operation and Support 
OMB   Office of Management and Budget 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
SAR   Selected Acquisition Report 
SOATG  Special Operations Air Task Group 
SOAWTG  Special Operations Air Warfare Training Group 
 xiv 
SOF   Special Operations Forces 
SR&S   Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank our wives and children for their tremendous patience and 
support in this and all of our professional endeavors. 
We would like to extend our gratitude to Brad Naegle and Dr. Kalev Sepp for 
their guidance and direction throughout the MBA Project process. 
We would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Smith and Major Michael 
Maksimowicz, United States Air Force.  The opportunity to research such an interesting 
and worthwhile topic would not have been possible without their collaboration. 
Finally, a special thanks to Greta E. Marlatt for her editorial support and 
guidance. 
 xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Headquarters 
(NSHQ) was established through the NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Transformation Initiative of 2006.  NSHQ’s mission is to function as the single point of 
development, direction, and coordination for all NATO Special Operations related 
activities in order to optimize employment of SOF.  NSHQ is also tasked to provide 
operational command capability when directed by the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR).  NSHQ is the alliance developer and manager of NATO SOF 
policy, standards, doctrine, training, and education assessments.  NSHQ is responsible 
for maintaining and developing a robust operational Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capability equipped with organic 
SOF enablers to ensure interoperability and enhance employment of NATO Special 
Operations.1 
Since NSHQ’s inception, NATO SOF have made significant gains in their 
ground and maritime SOF capability; however, aviation SOF have not kept pace as 
noted by Richard Newton, an instructor at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).  
To address this imbalance, in March of 2011, 30 representatives from 16 nations met to 
discuss NATO SOF air capability shortfalls.  The decision was made to provide the 
Military Committee with options to improve the identified shortfalls.  The 
recommendation adopted by the committee was to establish the NSHQ Special 
Operation Air Warfare Training Center (SOAWTC).  The NSHQ SOAWTC is 
responsible for conducting air warfare training and for fielding a Special Operations Air 
Task Group (SOATG) when directed.  Accomplishing these responsibilities requires a 
full program including policy, procedures, personnel, and equipment (including aircraft).  
The present goal of NSHQ is to have a fully operationally capable Combined SOF Air 
                                                 
1 United States Special Operations Command, Initial Capabilities Document for North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special Operations Air Warfare Center (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations 
Command, 2012). 
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Wing by late 2014.  In mid-2012, NATO will assign personnel to an Implementation 
Team, which will assume responsibility for developing this capability.   
The Director, NSHQ Future SOF Air, Lieutenant Colonel Manny Diwa 
approached the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty seeking assistance with the 
development of the SOAWTC.  By leveraging the research and analysis capabilities of 
NPS students, LTC Diwa sought to advance the development of the SOAWTC as much 
as possible prior to the Implementation Team’s establishment. As a result, when the 
Implementation Team is manned in mid-2012, it will already have a large amount of 
prepared analysis and recommendations upon which to build, rather than starting from 
scratch.  In response to LTC Diwa’s request, a collaborative effort between NPS and 
NSHQ was initiated to focus on four developmental tasks: 
1. Policy, doctrine, standards, and capability development 
2. Platform selection and fielding 
3. Location, selection, and establishment of air bases 
4. Organizational design and manning 
Two departments at NPS, the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
(GSBPP) and Defense Analysis (DA), joined the effort.  From these departments, a multi-
disciplinary team was formed of 18 U.S. and international officers from several military 
specialties.  The students were joined in a directed study program led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Dwight Davis of the DA department and Dr. Keenan Yoho of the GSBPP. The 
research conducted by this directed study group was sub-divided into eight sections to 
perform analysis and provide possible solutions within the focus areas listed above.  This 
research assesses the issues of platform selection and fielding for the rotary aircraft 
portion of the SOAWTC air wing, based upon NSHQ’s research to date and NATO SOF 
doctrine.  NSHQ’s primary stated constraints are cost and schedule, so this research 
focuses on the issues of acquisition and life cycle costs along with ease of program 
implementation and oversight. 
 3 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. NATO’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL 
FORCES 
In 2010, the heads of NATO member nations met in Lisbon to draft a new 
strategic concept.  This was the first formal revision of NATO’s core strategy since 1999, 
and numerous significant events, such as the September 11 terror attacks and the resultant 
operations in Afghanistan, had occurred in the years since.2  Leading up to this summit, 
various interested parties assessed likely future NATO requirements and the direction 
that NATO should take in developing its new strategic guidance. 
A 2009 paper by RAND Project Air Force framed the future of NATO 
engagements into five possible focus areas: Europe, the Middle East, fragile states, non-
state threats, and a global alliance.3  Special Forces would have a role in any of these 
possible focus areas, but the Middle East, fragile states, and non-state threat focuses have 
the largest direct requirements for a robust SOF capability.  Roles for SOF in the Middle 
East would include the ability to project small-scale force against extremist groups and 
threats to energy reserves.  In fragile state scenarios such as Afghanistan, Somalia and 
Darfur, SOF provide precision kinetic options beyond the scope of conventional forces.4  
SOF also have proven efficacy against non-state threats like terrorist groups and similar 
organizations as recently evinced by the May 2011 raid against Osama Bin Laden’s 
compound.  Under every combination of focus areas considered likely by RAND for the 
future of NATO operations, at least one of these SOF-intensive categories was included.5 
The Multiple Futures Project (MFP) established by NATO’s Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) observed in their April 2009 final report, Navigating towards 
                                                 
2 Phillip R. Cuccia, Implications of a Changing NATO (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2010). 
3 Christopher Chivvis, Recasting NATO’s Strategic Concept Possible Directions for the United States 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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2030, that a “large-scale conventional confrontation is unlikely.”6  The MFP report also 
lists the top two military implications for NATO’s likely future as protection against 
asymmetric threats and the ability to conduct operations against non-state actors.7  In the 
MFPs Findings and Recommendations, they enunciate their expectation that future 
threats to NATO will be asymmetric and will include, “irregular, terrorist and criminal 
elements in mixed modes of operation.”8  Asymmetric, non-state threats, irregular, non-
conventional; these are exactly the types of environments and operations that call for 
well-developed SOF capabilities. 
NATO’s Strategic Concept, produced at Lisbon in November 2010, affirmed that 
there is little threat to the alliance from conventional forces, that international terrorism 
along with instability and conflict beyond NATO’s borders is a threat, and that 
appropriate military capabilities should be developed to address these.  They also stated 
that NATO should maximize the deployability of forces that can operate jointly and that 
share common capabilities, in an effort to be cost-effective and efficient while showing 
solidarity among its members.9  Further development of alliance SOF capabilities would 
effectively advance NATO’s strategic requirements as well as their goals for cost 
effectiveness and efficiency.   
B. NATO SOF AS A COMBINED STRATEGIC ASSET 
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) delineates the 
characteristics of NATO SOF.  SOF are described as strategic assets that are innately 
joint.  This distinctly separates NATO SOF operations from individual member nations’ 
SOF operations.10  As strategic assets, SOF provides NATO numerous options to achieve 
                                                 
6 NATO. Allied Command Transformation, Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Towards 2030: 
Final Report, [2009]), 6. 
7 Ibid., 44. 
8 Ibid., 8. 
9 Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Adopted by Heads of State and 
Government in Lisbon (Belgium: NATO, [2010]). 
10 NATO Partnership for Peace. “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5.” January 
2009, http://www.tradoc.mil.al/Standartizimi/Downloads/AJP-3.5.pdf (accessed November 30, 2011). 
 5 
strategic effects through kinetic operations in a variety of conflict situations.11  This 
powerful strategic capability is cost efficient, well-suited to combining resources to 
maximize capabilities, and has the potential to enhance alliance nations’ individual forces 
through training and transferring skills. 
Colonel Joel Hillison of the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army 
War College, observes that NATO’s “new member states will be eager to contribute to 
the alliance but will be constrained by political and military capability shortfalls.”12   In 
the European Union’s (EU) Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2010) report, What Do 
Europeans Want from NATO, Sven Biscop, the Director of the Europe in the World 
Programme at Egmont—Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, states: 
Having largely the same European Member States, NATO and the EU 
have logically identified the same shortfalls in their members’ military 
inventory.  These shortfalls sharply limit the deployability and 
sustainability of European armed forces, in spite of their impressive 
overall numbers.13 
Biscop goes on to note that, “a plethora of small-scale capabilities, of limited 
deployability and low cost-effectiveness, is scattered across Europe.”14 
NATO has acknowledged the same issues with regard to SOF.  Alliance nations 
have widely varying SOF capabilities.  Some nations have advanced capabilities and 
experience operating in the joint environment while others are only just beginning to 
develop inchoate SOF capabilities from their existing defense organizations.15  However, 
even those nations with robust capabilities are finding themselves constrained financially, 
and the alliance as a whole could benefit from combining their resources. The NATO 
Group of Experts study states that: 
                                                 
11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008). 
12 Phillip R. Cuccia, Implications of a Changing NATO (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2010), 8. 
13 Sven Biscop et al., What do Europeans Want from NATO? (Paris: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 2010), 23. 
14 Ibid. 
15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008). 
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The primary limiting factor hindering military transformation has been the 
lack of European defence spending and investment.  Today only six of 
twenty-six European Allies spend 2 percent or more of GDP on these 
purposes; only about a dozen have met goals for making military forces 
deployable and sustainable.16 
The fiscal environment is likely to tighten even more, as some EU nations teeter 
on the brink of default, and the Central Bank and Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development predict another European recession.  There is even now concern that 
some countries may leave the EU, which has the potential to significantly damage 
Europe’s financial system and will likely create even greater pressure to reduce defense 
expenditures.17  
 The significant imbalance in SOF capabilities and universal financial constraints 
faced by alliance nations are compelling reasons to pursue shared SOF capability.  In 
2009, NATO convened a Group of Experts led by chair Madeleine Albright to consider 
the future of NATO.  In their report, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic 
Engagement, they state:   
If NATO is to keep pace with evolving threats, it must improve its 
capabilities more rapidly than it has.  The challenge of catching up is 
aggravated by a less than favourable economic climate. The best and most 
realistic way to close the gap is through a commitment to efficiency 
measures and other reforms.18  
This sentiment is echoed by Biscop when he states that, “Member states could at the 
same time opt for far-reaching forms of pooling… Not each individual member state, but 
member states as a collective entity, ought to be comprehensively capable.”19  Indeed, 
the new strategic guidance developed in Lisbon stresses the importance of combined 
capabilities that are greater than those of the individual contributing nations.  The concept 
                                                 
16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Public Diplomacy Division, NATO 2020: Assured Security; 
Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendation of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept 
for NATO (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010), 38. 
17 Robert Haddick, “This Week at War: Europe Powers Down,” Foreign Policy, November 4, 2011. 
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Public Diplomacy Division, NATO 2020: Assured Security; 
Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendation of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept 
for NATO (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010), 41. 
19 Sven Biscop et al., What do Europeans Want from NATO? (Paris: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 2010). 
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calls for developing and strengthening joint capabilities with a focus on deployability, 
sustainability, coherence in planning, and reduced duplication of effort to maximize cost 
effectiveness and to enhance solidarity.20    
NATO SOF is an ideal area of investment for maximizing efficiency and 
effectiveness.  A small contingent of SOF is as capable as (and frequently preferable to) a 
much larger conventional force for many of the mission areas NATO is likely to 
encounter.  Additionally, SOF capability can be developed and fielded at a small fraction 
of the cost of conventional military hardware.21 
In addition to their cost-effectiveness, NATO SOF can help to improve the 
capabilities of alliance members with less developed SOF.  Extensive, realistic training 
with repeated rehearsals is the cornerstone of developing SOF capable forces.22  SOF 
operators returning to their host nation after a tour with NATO are going to be highly 
capable, with a host of transferable skills.  This will begin to reduce the current 
imbalance in SOF capabilities throughout the alliance. 
C. THE NEED FOR AVIATION SOF CAPABILITY IN NATO 
 Organic air capability for NATO SOF will require some investment.  However, 
the size of the investment is small, scalable, and offers a strong return on investment 
when compared to other defense articles.  The Group of Experts stresses that military 
transformation and the development of new capabilities are necessary.  These capabilities 
should enable a “flexible, mobile, and versatile” posture that maximizes financial 
efficiency in light of NATO member nation’s fiscal constraints.  They further state: “The 
Alliance must also make a firm commitment to smarter spending through a variety of 
                                                 
20 Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Adopted by Heads of State and 
Government in Lisbon (Belgium: NATO, 2010). 
21 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 31–32. 
22 Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006), 11. 
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efficiency and reform measures.”23  Among other priorities, the Group of Experts calls 
for strengthening NATO’s SOF to improve their expeditionary capabilities.24  The heads 
of NATO affirm the need for new capabilities in the 2010 strategic concept, stating in 
passage 25 the need to “develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary 
operations, including counterinsurgency.”25 
 Richard Newton notes that NATO has made significant gains in the areas of 
ground and maritime SOF, but that aviation SOF has not kept pace.  This limits the 
efficacy of their SOF, since the capability to transport personnel for their unique mission 
sets frequently is not available, or has never been developed.26  In the introduction to 
Newton’s (2006) monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Mahan, the Director of 
JSOU’s Strategic Studies Department, observes: 
However, the role of SOF will be extremely important, especially as 
NATO operates outside its traditional European zone of operations.  The 
need to work with non-NATO forces and allies will increasingly require 
SOF capabilities.  These SOF requirements will operate across the full 
spectrum of SOF capabilities and, logically, will need to include a robust 
and capable air component.27      
 The NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre’s Special Operations Forces 
Study completed in December 2008 explicitly calls for air mobility as a key enabler for 
NATO SOF, stressing that the current ad-hoc arrangements used for SOF transportation 
do not meet the necessary high levels of proficiency needed for SOF operations.  The 
study notes that effective SOF aviation operations require a tremendous amount of 
specialized and repetitive training that can best be met with organic SOF aircraft and 
                                                 
23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Public Diplomacy Division, NATO 2020: Assured Security; 
Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendation of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept 
for NATO (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010), 11. 
24 Ibid., 40. 
25 Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Adopted by Heads of State and 
Government in Lisbon (Belgium: NATO, 2010). 
26 Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006). 
27 Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006), V. 
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personnel.28  Ad-hoc arrangements for SOF mobility reduce SOF effectiveness and 
flexibility while increasing risk to their “No Fail” mandate.  Most recently, NATO 
Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) commissioned a Special Operations Air Group 
Concept for Development and Organization study intended to develop a specific aviation 
proposal that would maximize the utility of NATO’s current SOF investments.29  The 
primary goal of this initial investment is to enable and enhance current NATO SOF 
ground capability.30        
 The AJP-3.5 calls for special operations to be “covert, discreet, or low 
prominence”; it also calls for “adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self 
reliance.”31  Keeping operations discreet requires a high level of operational security.  As 
described in the NATO Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC) study, “Special 
operations are routinely conducted under circumstances where the activities performed 
must remain unnoticed, are not attributable, or are conducted discretely so as to minimize 
visibility.”32  An organic air capability allows SOF to operate independently of 
conventional support forces, and thereby improves operational security by limiting the 
number of personnel and organizations that are required to be in-the-know.      
The ability to rapidly field capability in response to opportunities is also 
dramatically improved with the availability of organic air assets.  A dynamic target is 
defined as “a target that has been identified too late or has not been selected for action in 
time to be included in the deliberate targeting process.”33  As emphasized in NSHQ’s 
Special Air Warfare Manual (2010): 
                                                 
28 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), A2. 
29 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010), 4. 
30 Ibid., 6. 
31 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (Belgium: 
NATO, 2009), 1-1-1-2. 
32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 8. 
33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Special Air Warfare Manual. Version 1.0 (SHAPE, Belgium: 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 2010), 41. 
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Timing is a critical factor in tactical mission planning.  While an SOATG 
(Special Operation Air Task Group) can usually execute its assigned 
missions rapidly, the time required for joint mission planning, rehearsals, 
preparing the aircraft and the aircrew, deconflicting required routes and 
battlespace, and coordinating with other components for enabling 
air/aviation support can be significant.34  
SOF ground supported by organic air units that train together and have properly 
outfitted aircraft can reduce mission lead times from days to hours, greatly enhancing the 
flexibility and decision space for commanders.35  When time is of the essence, there is no 
replacement for organic capability.   
Organic air also provides operational capabilities that cannot be matched by 
outside support agencies.  The joint SOF doctrine specifically states that “special air 
operations differ from conventional air operations in degree of physical and political risk, 
operational techniques, methods of employment, and independence from friendly 
support”.36  These unique techniques, methods, and autonomy of air operations are 
frequently critical to the effective employment of SOF.  As described in the NSCC SOF 
(2008) study: 
SOF environmental training habitually prepares SOF to ‘conduct 
operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.’  
SOF typically thrive in such environments because of their ability to 
exercise the operational autonomy and independence these circumstances 
create. Quite often SOF seek to leverage the conditions in these 
environments to their advantage for infiltration, exfiltration, or to obscure 
the signature of their activities.37 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Special Air Warfare Manual. Version 1.0 (SHAPE, Belgium: 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 2010), 43. 
35 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010),8–9. 
36 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (Belgium: 
NATO, 2009), 2–5. 
37 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 14. 
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The AJP-3.5 states more generally that: 
The successful conduct of special operations relies on individual and small 
unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional 
operational skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and 
self reliance.38 
Air capability has not advanced as rapidly as have other areas of NATO SOF.  
NATO has acknowledged the need to improve capabilities, and SOF air is an ideal place 
for that investment.  Organic air would enhance and enable the capabilities of currently 
existing SOF ground forces, and it would offer benefits of training and skill transfer to 
participating member nations. It would align strongly with NATO’s stated goals of cost-
effectiveness, efficiency, and combined capabilities, all while providing improved 
flexibility to NATO commanders.  
D. SOF AIR MISSIONS AND REQUIRED SKILL SETS 
SOF air shares the common missions of Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance 
and Surveillance, and Military Assistance with all SOF forces.39  However, as delineated 
in the Special Air Warfare Manual, “The primary mission of special operations air forces 
is enhanced air mobility—specialised air transport (AT) activities via fixed-wing, rotary-
wing, or tilt rotor aircraft.”40  These missions include tasks that exceed conventional air 
forces capabilities.  As listed in the Guidelines for NATO SOF Helicopter Operations,41 
the primary skill sets include: 
(a) Advanced Night Vision Goggle (NVG) flying, including NVG 
formation, nap of the earth (NOE) flying, and NVG over-water 
operations.  
(b) Fast rope insertion and extraction techniques  
                                                 
38 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (Belgium: 
NATO, 2009), 1–2. 
39 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010), 7. 
40 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010), 5–6. 
41 Ibid., 9–10. 
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(c) Multi-story building landings  
(d) Aggressive tactical approaches and departures  
(e) Deck landings on vessels  
(f) Approaches to moving vehicles  
(g) Airborne vehicle control point (VCP) operations 
(h) Specialised personnel recovery techniques 
(i) Joint planning with strategic and operational level reconnaissance 
assets 
(j) Coordinating and directing joint fires 
E. NATO SOF CHALLENGES UNDER THE CURRENT STRUCTURE 
The NATO Special Operations Forces Study proffers that SOF operates under a 
“No Fail” mandate.  As small unit, highly trained forces operating in complex 
environments on irregular and critically important tasks, a level of perfection is called for 
that is unparalleled.  The high level of proficiency and performance required necessitates 
lengthy training and rehearsal, and as a result SOF forces and capabilities cannot be 
generated on short notice.42  To enable NATO SOF to conduct short notice missions with 
critical aviation elements (e.g., low level insertion/extraction, perhaps at night, perhaps 
using unconventional methods), it is imperative that the SOF aviators train extensively 
with the SOF ground operators to hone their skills.  Currently, that is not always an 
option, and capability is lessened as a result. 
In the absence of well-integrated SOF with extensive experience working 
together, ad-hoc arrangements of forces and support must be utilized.  NATO SOF forces 
have been called upon to conduct numerous recent missions out of area in the Balkans, 
Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond.43  However, experience has shown that 
deficiencies in organization, interoperability, and resourcing have limited the efficacy of 
                                                 
42 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 15–18. 
43 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 1. 
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these forces in many cases.  As the NSCC (2008) study recounts, “Historically, ad hoc 
temporary arrangements cobbled together to perform these operations prove incapable of 
fulfilling the challenges inherent to special operations and result in disastrous 
consequences.”44 
Even without “disastrous consequences,” the reliance upon ad hoc arrangements 
may result in the inability to perform missions or acceptance of less preferred tactics and 
reduced objectives.  As noted by Richard Newton,  
conducting air transportation operations to meet the Special Forces’ 
primary needs of insertion, extraction, and resupply… has proven to be a 
daunting environmental challenge and has highlighted severe shortfalls in 
current and projected special operations aircraft.45   
Since NATO SOF frequently does not have dedicated air platforms, they must rely on ad 
hoc arrangements for air mobility support.  According to the draft NSHQ Special 
Operations Air Group (2010) report, in Afghanistan, numerous NATO SOF missions 
have not been executed because of air mobility shortfalls.  In some cases, no aircraft were 
available at all.  In other cases, aircraft were available but were assigned to other 
emergent missions for their parent organizations.  Even when aircraft are available, it 
may not be possible to execute missions due to the longer mission planning, rehearsal, 
and execution cycle required by non-SOF aviation.  As a result of these circumstances, 
NATO SOF sometimes found themselves “unable to execute a mission when they were 
otherwise capable and ready to do so.”46  Organic aviation capability would have 
tremendously mitigated, if not eliminated, these situations for Special Operations Forces.  
Organic air provides improved availability, response time, reliability, and performance, 
all of which result in a significantly more capable force and improved options for 
commanders. 
                                                 
44 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 17. 
45 Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006), 7. 
46 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010), 8. 
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F. THE PRIMACY OF SOF PERSONNEL OVER EQUIPMENT 
The fundamental attributes of SOF operations, and the specific skill sets for SOF 
aviation described above, all focus primarily on the capabilities of the SOF personnel and 
their level of expertise in operating their aircraft rather than the type of aircraft utilized.  
This illustrates an underlying principle: SOF personnel and their skill sets are more 
important to mission performance than their equipment.  As Newton observes: 
Many missions can be safely accomplished by highly trained crews using 
conventional, unmodified aircraft.  Time and again, SOF aviators have 
reaffirmed the validity of a SOF truth, ‘Humans are more important than 
hardware.’  It was SOF aviators, flying conventional aircraft better than 
their non-SOF counterparts—more precisely, in harsher environments, 
mitigating the risks, and using conventional equipment in innovative 
ways—that proved it is the person, not the technology, that defines special 
operations.47  
This principle is included in NATO doctrine.  As presented in AJP-3.5: 
Special air operations, like ground and maritime special operations, are not 
defined only by equipment utilized, but rather by the unconventional and 
innovative ways aircrews employ whatever they have at their disposal… 
What is required… are highly trained airmen who employ their aircraft in 
ways unexpected by their adversary.48 
The Special Air Warfare Manual reiterates that: “It is the capabilities of the people, rather 
than the equipment they use, that defines special air warfare.”49 
Beyond the primacy of people versus equipment, a focus on high-end aircraft will 
likely incur inefficiencies.  An illustrative example is described in some detail by Newton 
in his 2006 monograph.  In it, he discusses the experience of United States Air Force 
(USAF) Special Forces operating C-130 Hercules aircraft that have been modified into 
MC-130 Combat Talons.  These aircraft have enhanced capabilities for operating in 
sophisticated air-defense environments; however, this performance enhancement comes 
                                                 
47 Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006), vii. 
48 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (Belgium: 
NATO, 2009), 2–5. 
49 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Special Air Warfare Manual. Version 1.0 (SHAPE, Belgium: 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 2010), 3. 
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at great cost.  The modified aircraft are very expensive to procure and maintain.  
Additionally, the aircrews require extensive specialized training beyond standard SOF 
baselines to utilize their advanced systems.  Since these top-of-the-line aircraft were 
organically controlled by USAF SOF, they tended to be used for all missions, even those 
for which a lesser aircraft would have sufficed.  The high cost of these platforms also 
meant that only a small force could be fielded.  The end result was extremely expensive 
aircraft being worn out flying missions that could have been conducted by standard 
aircraft.50      
In the constrained fiscal environment that NATO faces, the most efficient bang-
for-the-buck will be to focus on developing aircrew skills rather than purchasing high-end 
air frames.  General purpose helicopters with highly trained personnel can conduct a wide 
range of operations within the likely scenarios faced by NATO, and represent a very 
efficient use of limited financial reserves.   
In addition to being cost-effective, general purpose helicopters provide training 
advantages and enhanced interoperability.  A focus of effort on perfecting baseline SOF 
aviator skills like night ops, fast roping, and building landings is a more efficient use of 
training time than learning advanced systems for specialized aircraft that will typically 
not be required and will have little in common with the aircraft that many member 
nations fly.   
Newton (2006) points out numerous historical examples of SOF airmen who did 
not have advanced aircraft, rather: 
They flew their airplanes, helicopters, or gliders better than anyone ever 
thought possible.  Therefore, I would also recommend that organic special 
operations air and aviation units have dedicated airmen and aircraft that 
train to higher standards and meet the minimal qualifications for special 
operations aviation.51 
 
                                                 
50 Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006), 6. 
51 Ibid., 12. 
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Training and rehearsal at the level necessary to perfect baseline special operations skills 
is extensive, and represents the best use of NATO SOF Air training time.  To efficiently 
and effectively meet this goal, a general-purpose platform is preferable to a specialty 
helicopter. 
Interoperability is also enhanced by selecting a basic helicopter for SOF use.  As 
stated in the Special Air Warfare Manual: “Interoperability is the key to successful 
NATO special air warfare.”52  As reiterated in the NATO Backgrounder, Interoperability 
for Joint Operations (2006), the alliance can only operate effectively with strong 
interoperability.  This enables forces to work together, share resources, reduces 
duplication of effort, allows pooling of resources, and results in synergies.53  Common 
equipment is not required for interoperability; however, it greatly enhances it.  Beyond 
interoperability is commonality.  The NATO SOF study points out that: 
Commonality is defined by NATO as ‘a state achieved when groups of 
individuals, organizations, or nations use common doctrine, procedures, or 
equipment.’  This is precisely what NATO SOF requires to coalesce into a 
viable NATO instrument.54 
Major General Ton van Loon of the Royal Netherlands Army said in 2007, upon 
returning from Afghanistan: 
When I was commanding RC (regional command) South, we had four 
national Chinook detachments on the ramp at Kandahar from Australia, 
the Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S.—but their respective aircraft were 
so different that their mechanics could not work on other nations’ aircraft; 
nor could the aircrew fly in aircraft other than those of their own unit.  
Because we can’t share the logistics and maintenance, the whole thing 
becomes more expensive and more complicated to organize, which is 
directly translated in loss of potential.55 
                                                 
52 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Special Air Warfare Manual. Version 1.0 (SHAPE, Belgium: 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 2010), 11. 
53 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Backgrounder: Interoperability for Joint Operations,” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/html_en/interoperability01.html (accessed December 2, 2011), 1. 
54 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations 
Forces Study (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre [NSCC], 2008), 34. 
55 Joris Janssen Lok, “Rotary Imbalance.” Aviation Week 167, no. 21, November 2007, 32. 
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This type of struggle is all too common in joint operations and is a strong argument for 
NATO SOF fielding standardized general-purpose helicopters. 
G. AIRFRAME SELECTION  
Cost, as previously stated, is an obvious and central consideration for selection.  If 
a general purpose rather than a high-end/specialty aircraft is desired, what should the 
other criteria for selection include?  The NSHQ draft Special Operations Air Group 
Concept (2010) study used the following minimum requirements to narrow the selection: 
(1) Currently in Production (major platform model, not specific variant) 
(2) Available for Purchase 
(3) Replacement and Repair Parts in production 
(4) Sufficient numbers in existence for “normalizing” data 
(5) Availability of reliable third-party specifications and performance data 
(6) In use by the armed services of two or more NATO member nations 
(7) Minimum Surface Ceiling (1,364 kg load) 3,658 meters 
(8) Internal Payload of 6 Fully Equipped PAX 
(9) Wire Strike Protective System 
(10) Armoured Crew Seats 
(11) Active and Passive Countermeasures 
(12) Weather Radar 
(13) Night Vision Equipped/Capable 
(14) Cargo Hook with Rescue Hoist Capable 
(15) Range of 400KM + 
(16) Minimum Useful Load 1,364kg 
(17) Minimum 2 Heavy Machine Gun (NATO 7.62 or 12.7) 
 
 18 
This reduced their original list of more than one-hundred variants to just eight.56  
However they were unable to reduce the list further “due to the number of aircraft 
variants that can be properly configured to meet requirements.”   
With “heavy weighting… placed on a platform’s past history, NATO member 
nation usage, and production availability,” along with price, performance, analysis of 
NSHQ missions, and interviews with operators, the report suggested a few platforms that 
stood out from the rest.57  These aircraft were: the EC-145, NH-90, and MI-17/8MT, 
though no quantitative analysis or suggestion beyond this was offered.  Ultimately, the 
report strongly suggested using loaned/gifted SH-60 aircraft from the U.S. in the near 
term.  This would provide more time to consider the best long-term solution, would allow 
a low-cost initial capability, and was considered cost-effective since it deferred 
procurement costs.58  The study also proposed an initial capability of two rotary wing 
squadrons with four aircraft each, for a total of eight aircraft.59   Subsequent guidance 
from NSHQ has indicated a reduced requirement for initial capability of two squadrons 
of three aircraft each for a total of six aircraft. 
H. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
This research conducts further market analysis of procurement and sustainment 
options.  It considers the loaned/gifted U.S. airframe option, recommended European 
airframes, a hybrid solution of gifted U.S. airframes for initial capability transitioning to 
European aircraft for long-term operations, and organic versus contracted maintenance.  
The goal of this work is not to select the platform for NATO.  Rather, it is to present 
more detailed (predominately financial) analysis of the alternatives for developing the 
initial NATO SOF organic helicopter capability. 
                                                 
56 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010), 20. 
57 Ibid., 23. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 2. 
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1. UH-72A LAKOTA 
The UH-72A LAKOTA, is a militarized version of the Eurocopter EC-145 built 
by the American Eurocopter division of European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
Company N.V. (EADS), and is readily available as a COTS item.  The Eurocopter EC-
145 was identified in the NSHQ air study as one of the air frames that stood out from the 
rest.60  The U.S. Army currently uses the LAKOTA as its Light Utility Helicopter 
(LUH). The LAKOTA program provides the Army with the capability to accomplish a 
wide-range of administrative and logistical missions. For the Army and the Army 
National Guard, these aircraft provide General Support, Homeland Security mission 
assistance, to include security and support, search and rescue, counterdrug operations, 
reconnaissance and surveillance, and traditional medevac. The planned delivery of 345 
aircraft will replace the Army’s aging UH-1 and OH-58A aircraft, freeing up the UH-60 
Black Hawk for use in other theaters of operation.   
 
Figure 1.   UH-72A LAKOTA61 
                                                 
60 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010). 
61 “UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter” (presentation, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, 
Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011) 
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The standard configuration for the UH-72A comes equipped with modern cockpit 
communication and navigation systems compatible with civilian aerospace systems.  The 
flight station is NVG compatible and includes radar altimetry, full autopilot, and a unique 
First Limit Indicator, which simplifies engine monitoring and reduces pilot workload.62 
 
 
Figure 2.   UH-72A LAKOTA Port Aspect Overview63 
Since the UH-72A is a COTS aircraft, the modification process is different from a 
tradition defense combat system. Operational Needs Statements (ONS) are submitted 
through Army Commands (ACOM) to the Headquarters, Department of the Army 
(HQDA) G3 to modify the aircraft configurations for Mission Essential Packages (MEPs) 
to suit specific mission requirements. All modifications must be conducted in-
accordance-with (IAW) FAA regulations.  However, it should be noted that any airframe 
modification will cause changes in contracted logistic support rates. The Security and 
                                                 
62 Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval, s.v. “LUH,” last updated December 31, 
2010, https://ebiz.acq.osd.mil/damir. 
63 “UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter” (presentation, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, 
Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011) 
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Support MEP is best suited to handle mission requirements highlighted in the NSHQ 
draft Special Operations Air Group Concept (2010) study. The Security and Support 
modifications are displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   UH-72A LAKOTA Starboard Aspect Overview64 
 The UH-72A program developed for the U.S. Army uses contractor logistics 
support (CLS) for its maintenance.  Active Army units receive full CLS, while the Army 
National Guard has implemented a hybrid form that allows Guard members to conduct 
field-level maintenance.  The UH-72A program has benefited from this logistics support 
arrangement and the resultant ease of program implementation, which has allowed the 
aircraft to quickly enter service with major success, meeting all of its cost, schedule, and 
performance goals.65 
                                                 
64 “UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter” (presentation, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, 
Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011). 
65 “Army Weapons and Equipment: Aircraft,” Army Magazine 60, no. 10 (October 2010).  
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2. SH-60F SEAHAWK 
Naval development for the SH-60 began in 1977 when the UH-60A Black Hawk 
won the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) Mk III competition for 
shipboard helicopters.66  The first SH-60B was received by the Navy in 1983. Then the 
Navy began development of the SH-60F variant to replace the SH-3 Sea King and the 
first SH-60F was delivered in 1988.  The SH-60F is categorized as a carrier (CV) inner-
zone Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopter and its primary role is for close-in ASW 
protection for carrier groups. The secondary mission for the SH-60F included search and 
rescue (SAR) and plane guard during carrier flight operations.67      
SH-60F is a twin engine helicopter equipped with all the LAMPS Mk III avionics; 
with exception to the large cylindrical fairing under the nose, housing the 360-degree- 
Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), an electronic surveillance/ support measures (ESM) 
system, missile jamming equipment and missile plume detectors.68 In addition to the 
removal of the MAD fairings, the cargo hook and Recovery Assist, Secure and Traverse 
(RAST) systems were also removed.  Integrated into the SH-60F were the ASW mission 
avionics including Honeywell AN/AQS-13F dipping sonar, MIL-STD-1553B data bus, 
dual Litton AN/ASN-150 tactical navigation computers and AN/ASM-614 avionics 
support equipment, automatic flight control system with quicker automatic transition and 
both cable and Doppler auto hover, and tactical data link.69   
                                                 
66 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, s.v. “Sikorsky S-70B,”  accessed February 29, 2012, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/yb/jawa/jaw
a1458.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Sikorsky S-
70B&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JAWA&. 
67 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, s.v. “Sikorsky S-70B,”  accessed February 29, 2012, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/yb/jawa/jaw
a1458.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Sikorsky S-
70B&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JAWA&. 
68 “SH-60 LAMPS MK III Seahawk,” Federation of American Scientists, last modified December 27, 
1999, accessed March 3, 2012, http://www.fas.org/man//dod-101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm. 
69 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, s.v. “Sikorsky S-70B,”  accessed February 29, 2012, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/yb/jawa/jaw
a1458.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Sikorsky S-
70B&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JAWA&. 
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Figure 4.   SH-60F Illustration70 
 
Figure 5.   SH-60F Photograph71 
                                                 
70 “SH-60 LAMPS MK III Seahawk,” Federation of American Scientists, last modified December 27, 
1999, accessed March 3, 2012, http://www.fas.org/man//dod-101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm. 
71 “SH-60 LAMPS MK III Seahawk,” Federation of American Scientists, last modified December 27, 
1999, accessed March 3, 2012, http://www.fas.org/man//dod-101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm. 
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In later versions of the SH-60F, communications control system, multifunction 
keypads and displays for each of four crew members; internal/external fuel system and 
extra weapon station to port allowing carriage of three Mk 50 homing torpedoes; 
provision for surface search radar, FLIR, night vision equipment, passive ECM, MAD, 
air-to-surface missile capability, sonobuoy data link, chaff/sonobuoy dispenser, attitude 
and heading reference system (AHRS), Navstar GPS, fatigue monitoring system and 
increase of maximum T-O weight to 10,659 kg (23,500 lbs); secondary missions include 
SAR and plane guard.72  Table 1 gives and aircraft comparison for both the UH-72A and 
the SH-60F. 
Table 1. Comparative Aircraft Performance Data. 
 UH-72A SH-60F 
Length 42 feet, 7 inches 64 feet, 10 inches 
Height 11 feet, 9 inches         17 feet 
Rotor Diameter 36 Feet         53 feet 8 inches 
Max Take-off Weight        7,903 lbs.         23,500 lbs. 
Range    370  nautical miles   245 nautical miles 
Airspeed        145 knots         183 mph 
Ceiling        18,000 feet         12,000 feet 
Propulsion (2) Turbomecca Arriel 
1E2 turboshafts 
(2) General  Electric GE-
T700-401C 
Thrust (per engine) 738 SHP 1,890 SHP 
Rate of Climb (FPM) 1,600 1,650 
Crew 2 3-4 
Capacity 
 
8 Troops or 2 Stretchers 8-10 Troops 
                                                 
72 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, s.v. “Sikorsky S-70B,”  accessed February 29, 2012, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/yb/jawa/jaw
a1458.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Sikorsky S-
70B&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JAWA&. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the rationale used for the analysis of alternatives available to 
NATO SOF for establishing a six helicopter air wing, and the approach taken in 
analyzing the data obtained during research.  The analysis makes both quantitative and 
qualitative comparisons to assess options for moving the program forward, considerations 
for program sustainment, and recommendations for further research.  Underlying goals 
and objectives were synthesized from NATO SOF doctrine and the 2010 NSHQ draft 
Special Operations Air Group Concept study (as discussed in the background chapter), 
along with information obtained during discussions with NATO personnel.  The goal is to 
assess various courses of action NATO SOF could select to acquire organic general 
purpose helicopters.  These helicopters will meet the missions of air mobility (to enhance 
NATO SOF ground capability) and training and skill transfer (to enhance NATO member 
nation capabilities).  The primary concerns of the analysis are cost effectiveness and ease 
of implementation.  Quantitative analysis will consider acquisition costs and the portions 
of operation and support costs that aid in discriminating between platforms.  Qualitative 
analysis will address the ease of implementation, training and skill transfer 
considerations, organic maintenance and logistics support implementation versus 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) options, and a discussion of concerns and 
considerations regarding the MI-17.  
A. AIRCRAFT CHOSEN FOR ANALYSIS: SH-60, EC-145, MI-17  
The primary aircraft analyzed for this study are the SH-60 and the EC-145.  The 
SH-60 and its variants are ubiquitous aircraft in the United States military with easy 
availability and a ready supply of excess defense articles (EDAs).  Under section 516 of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, the U.S. Government has  
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the authority to transfer surplus military equipment to foreign security forces.73  The 
Department of State, in their FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Assistance states that: 
EDA articles are transferred in an ''as is, where is" condition to the 
recipient and are only offered in response to a demonstrated requirement. 
The grant EDA program operates at essentially no cost to the United 
States, with the recipient responsible for any required refurbishment and 
repair of the items as well as any associated transportation costs.74 
The statement that EDAs are “as is, where is,” at “essentially no cost” to the U.S., and 
that the recipient is liable for refurbishment, repair, and transportation is notable.  This 
means that there can be significant costs for the recipient of EDAs.  In fact, analysis of 
this alternative will include a detailed estimate of costs from a 2009 proposed transfer of 
six EDA SH-60s from U.S. Navy stocks that includes the costs mentioned above.   
The second helicopter considered at length is the UH-72 LAKOTA, which is a 
militarized version of the Eurocopter EC-145 built by the American Eurocopter division 
of European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company N.V. (EADS), and readily 
available as a commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) item.  The Eurocopter EC-
145 was identified in the NSHQ air study as one of the air frames that stood out from the 
rest.75  The U.S. Army currently uses the LAKOTA as its LUH, and significant data 
pulled from U.S. Army experience is included in this analysis. 
A third helicopter, the MI-17 Hip is addressed in this research, but in less detail.  
It was also identified in the NSHQ air study as a stand-out airframe, but reliable operation 
and support costs were unavailable, acquisition costs are fluctuating significantly, and the 
reliability/availability of spares and repair parts was questionable.  This airframe will be 
discussed in the qualitative analysis section with a recommendation for further research, 
but will not be addressed in the quantitative analysis.        
                                                 
73 Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislation on Foreign 
Relations through 2002 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). 
74 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Congressional Budget Justification: 
Foreign Assistance: Title IV Supporting Information, 2007). 
75 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for 
Development & Organisation (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010). 
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B. DATA ASSESSED AND SELECTED FOR USE 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) provided a line item summary of a 
letter of agreement (LOA) for an EDA transfer of six SH-60 aircraft from 2009 (see the 
Appendix).  This LOA includes all of the before mentioned costs of refurbishment, repair 
and transportation so serves as a useful basis of estimate for those.  Additionally, it 
includes costs for initial spares and logistics support for a two year startup period.  It also 
includes expenses for U.S. assistance in standing up organic logistics support capabilities 
for the recipient nation in a model similar to that used by the U.S. Navy.  The LOA is 
used in the quantitative analysis of the EDA procurement option since it so closely 
mirrors the requirements of the desired initial NATO rotary wing capability. It has the 
added benefit of being divided into discrete and easily separable charges that can be used 
for estimates under various assumptions regarding which costs NATO will be responsible 
for covering. 
From the brief assessment of the advantage of using EDA SH-60s in the NSHQ 
Air Study, and from discussions with NSHQ personnel, it appears that the costs 
delineated in the NAVAIR estimate are significantly higher than NATO is anticipating.  
NATO personnel discussed these SH-60s as being free or nearly free, and an inexpensive 
way to initiate the program.  This assumption might be justified if U.S. funding was made 
available to cover the costs associated with a traditional EDA grant. NATO has been in 
discussion with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) regarding 
funding, and it is expected that USSOCOM will pay some of the costs of the program.  
Since the U.S. may therefore, pay the initial costs of the SH-60s, a “SH-60 Free” 
calculation is included in the analysis.  This reflects the financial requirement of fielding 
the SH-60 aircraft if all of the refurbishment, repair, and transportation costs are defrayed 
by the U.S., and NATO is delivered free, fully operational helicopters. 
Procurement Costs of the EC-145 LAKOTA variant were taken from the Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR).  The number used for analysis of procurement costs is the Average Procurement 
Unit Cost (APUC) of the 345 LAKOTAs acquired by the U.S. Army at the time of the 
report.  The possibility that economies of scale might make the Army’s APUC lower than 
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what NATO could expect was considered, and an additional source of data sought.  The 
U.S. Navy operates just five LAKOTAs, offering the opportunity to analyze the effects of 
quantity on procurement cost.  The procurement cost to the Navy was found to be within 
five percent of the Army’s.  This alleviated the concerns of small batch procurement 
driving up costs for the LAKOTA.  With costs almost equal, the decision was made to 
use the Army data for analysis, since the Army’s cost data came from a formal report, 
while the Navy’s cost data came from a technician’s spreadsheet.   
Operation and Support (O&S) cost estimates are based upon the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller published 
reimbursable rates from FY2011.  These numbers include fuel, depot level repairables 
(DLRs), consumables, depot costs, and CLS costs for the SH-60.  For the LAKOTA, they 
include just fuel, CLS, and a small portion of depot costs (from the hybrid CLS contracts) 
since the other maintenance costs (DLRs and consumables) are included under the CLS 
contract.  Therefore, the comparisons made in O&S are between an organic maintenance 
capability for the SH-60 and a CLS (i.e., contractor provided logistics) package for the 
LAKOTA.  The comparison of these disparate support options for the two airframes will 
be considered both quantitatively (cost per flight hour) and qualitatively (ease of 
use/management for the operator).  Personnel costs for the pilots and aircrew are not 
included in this analysis, since NATO manning decisions are being made independently 
of the platform selection decision.  However, when NATO is determining total program 
costs, the personnel costs will need to be included. 
C. QUANTITATIVE (I.E., COST) ANALYSIS  
All costs were normalized to BY2011 using GDP deflator calculations based upon 
the most recent published Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tables.  Acquisition 
costs and the O&S costs mentioned above were combined to determine annual costs (not 
including personnel costs, as discussed), and extended to determine lifecycle costs.  The 
amount of funding available to NSHQ for program initiation and sustainment has not yet 
been determined.  Therefore, a variety of scenarios are outlined and costed to illustrate a 
representative range of options.  The duration of the SOF rotary wing program has also 
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not been determined.  The possibility of a 2019 end date has been mentioned, but the 
potential for extended operations should also be considered.  Therefore, this analysis 
presents estimates for both a 2019 end-date, and twenty-year program duration.  Twenty 
years was selected since it is the estimated operational life of many helicopters.  The 
three estimates analyzed and compared are: 
1. The Full NAVAIR EDA Program Startup Estimate:   
The costs from the NAVAIR provided LOA for six EDA SH-60s was analyzed by 
line item.  The analysis accounts for both the full-cost estimate including all elements for 
a full program startup, and for a zero-cost estimate assuming that all associated costs of 
bringing the EDAs to full operational capability will be paid by another agency.  An 
analysis of partial costs may be warranted if NATO is ultimately expected to pay only 
certain portions of the startup costs.  In that instance, the same methodology used in this 
research could be applied.  However, since no basis for such a partial estimate was 
available, it was not included in this analysis.  The O&S estimates were then added to 
these acquisition estimates, and extended to the year 2019.  The twenty year estimate was 
not made for the full-cost scenario.  Since EDA helicopters are already well into their 
operational life, the expense of repurchasing additional helicopters at this high cost prior 
to the end of the 20 year period was considered prohibitive. 
2. Comparison of “Free” SH-60s to EC-145 LAKOTA Variants over a 
Twenty-Year Period   
Free SH-60s (all startup costs paid by another agency) are less expensive in the 
short-term due to their zero procurement costs, but remain more expensive in the long-
term because of their greater O&S costs.  However, the initial expense of procuring six 
LAKOTAs at once may be prohibitive; therefore scenarios are considered for beginning 
the program using EDA SH-60s and replacing them with LAKOTAs in subsequent years, 
as funds become available.  Four different representative estimates are compared: 
1. Accepting six free EDA SH-60s and maintaining them, with additional 
free EDA SH-60 replacements as necessary.  This option therefore accrues 
only the O&S costs of the six aircraft for the twenty year period. 
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2. Purchasing six LAKOTAs in the initial year and maintaining them for the 
twenty year period (foregoing the use of EDA SH-60s altogether). 
3. Accepting six free EDA SH-60 aircraft to initiate the program, and then 
replacing them with LAKOTAs at a rate of two aircraft per year beginning 
in the second year of the program.  Assuming program initiation in 2013, 
the resulting aircraft inventory under this “Rapid Replacement” schedule 
is depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2. Aircraft Inventory Using the Rapid Replacement Schedule 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 and After 
SH-60s 6 4 2 0 
LAKOTAs 0 2 4 6 
 
• Accepting six free EDA SH-60 aircraft to initiate the program, and then 
replacing them with LAKOTAs at a rate of one aircraft per year beginning 
in the third year of the program. Assuming a program initiation in 2013, 
the resulting aircraft inventory of this “Gradual Replacement” schedule is 
depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3. Aircraft Inventory Using the Gradual Replacement Schedule 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
2020 and 
After 
SH-60s 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
LAKOTAs 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
The comparison of these four options illustrates the tradeoffs available to NSHQ 
between startup costs, life-cycle costs, and annual costs of the program.   
A final analysis considers the potential scenario of very short program duration 
that was mentioned as a possibility in discussions with NATO personnel.  SH-60 and 
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LAKOTA costs are reconsidered in this analysis with an assumed program start in 2013 
and an end in 2019 to determine the impact of short program duration on platform 
selection. 
D. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The Contract Logistics Support option available with the LAKOTA is considered 
and compared to the establishment and sustainment of organic maintenance and logistics 
support capabilities that would be required for the SH-60.  Analysis will consider 
availability and reliability, along with ease of program implementation and management 
of the CLS option.  The effect of platform selection on the stated goals of skill transfer 
and training among participating NATO member nations will be considered.  This section 
will also include a discussion of research conducted on the MI-17, with the benefits and 
potential pitfalls to NSHQ should they pursue procurement.   
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IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
There are three primary sources of cost data used in this analysis.  Purchase price 
for the Excess Defense Article (EDA) SH-60s was taken from a 2009 NAVAIR estimate 
prepared for a grant of six EDA SH-60s.  The cost breakdown is presented in Table 4.  
More detailed information is contained in the Appendix.   
Table 4. NAVAIR Costs for Grant of Six EDA SH-60s (2009 $s) 
CATEGORY PER UNIT QUANTITY TOTAL 
PLATFORM COST $0.00 6 $0.00 
ENGINES $803,665.00 14 $11,251,310.00 
TECH ASSIST $176,175.00 1 $176,175.00 
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT $7,191,881.00 1 $7,191,881.00 
SPARES $29,417,966.00 1 $29,417,966.00 
TRANSPORT $647,863.00 1 $647,863.00 
OVERHAUL $5,325,529.50 6 $31,953,177.00 
TRAINING $4,650,785.00 1 $4,650,785.00 
PUBLICATIONS $3,393,117.00 1 $3,393,117.00 
LOG TECH ASSIST $1,357,977.00 1 $1,357,977.00 
OTHER TECH ASSIST $3,505,855.00 1 $3,505,855.00 
ENG. TECH ASSIST $2,599,162.00 1 $2,599,162.00 
ENG. TECH SERVICES $2,436,000.00 1 $2,436,000.00 
ADMIN CHARGE $3,746,089.00 1 $3,746,089.00 
 
  TOTAL $102,327,357.00 
  
Per helo $17,054,559.50 
 
The helicopters were offered at no cost under section 516 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, and “as is, where is.”  The condition of these aircraft was 
described in the LOA as “serviceable, used—good.”   While the platforms themselves 
were no cost, the associated costs to return the aircraft to fully operational condition, 
transport them to the purchasing country, and implement a U.S. style logistics support 
program were considerable.  The line items cover materiel and support costs as follows: 
• Engines: Two new engines per helicopter were required, and two 
additional engines were procured as spares.   
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• Tech Assist: An assessment of the receiving nation’s existing logistics 
support system and the development of a subsequent plan of action 
enabling them to develop their logistics support capabilities to support the 
SH-60s. 
• Support Equipment: New-condition support equipment and calibration 
gear for one land-based (as opposed to sea-based) organizational level 
maintenance site.   
• Spares: Sufficient aircraft spares and repair parts to meet anticipated 
requirements for organizational level maintenance at one main base and 
one detachment for a period of two years.   
• Transport: The movement of the helicopters to the purchasing nation.  
Does not include any import duties or fees nor any enroute maintenance 
requirements.   
• Overhaul: The costs of new engine installation, other necessary new 
equipment procurement and installation, software installation, and follow-
on testing as required. This includes check flights.   
• Training: For six pilots and ten organizational level maintainers at a 
location in the United States.  Does not include room, board, or travel 
expenses for students.   
• Publications: All references required to conduct organizational level 
maintenance, including required publication updates for two years.   
• Logistics Technical Assist: Integrated logistics support and interim 
contractor support for the establishment of logistics programmatics.   
• Engineering Technical Assistance:  One engineer and two contractor 
support personnel for five years.   
• Engineering Technical Services: One airframe/engine representative and 
one avionics/electrical representative for two years.   
• Other Technical Assistance: unexplained 
• Administrative Charge: unexplained.   
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The estimate indicates that $17,054,560 (in BY2009 dollars) per helicopter 
covered initial overhaul, a significant portion of operation and support costs for the first 
two years, and the startup requirements for a U.S. Navy style logistics support program.   
The purchase price of the LUH LAKOTA (militarized EC-145) comes from the 
DAMIR SAR for the LUH and uses the average procurement unit cost.  None of the 
above mentioned program costs are included, but they are also not required if a CLS 
package comparable to that purchased by the U.S. Army is implemented.  In that case, 
NATO would not need to establish any organic maintenance capability.  
Operation and Support (O&S) costs are taken from the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Financial Management and Comptroller published reimbursable rates for 
FY2011.  For the purpose of this analysis, O&S costs include fuel, depot level repairables 
(i.e., parts), depot maintenance costs, consumable item usage, and associated contract 
logistics support costs.  Notably, it does not include crew pay.  
 Costs used in the following analysis have all been converted to BY 2011  
dollars using Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator calculations based  
upon figures reported by the OMB located at the White House web site at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.  Acquisition and O&S costs are 
presented in Table 5.  
Table 5. Summary of Cost Data 
PLATFORM PURCHASE PRICE 
Fuel/ 
FH 
DLR/ 
FH 
Consumables/ 
FH 
Depot/ 
FH 
CLS/ 
FH 
LAKOTA $5,758,500 $348 $0 $0 $192 $2,249 
SH60 COSTED $17,549,142 $354 $2,151 $586 $1,655 $962 
SH60 FREE $0 $354 $2,151 $586 $1,655 $962 
 
 Table 5 clearly illustrates that the majority of the costs listed as maintenance and 
support for the SH-60 are instead included in the CLS line item for the LAKOTA.  
Additionally, the O&S cost for the LAKOTA ($2,789/flight hour) is significantly less 
than for the SH-60 ($5,708/flight hour).  
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The SH-60 Costed model assumes NATO pays the full costs associated with an 
EDA grant (overhaul, transport, etc.) and program startup delineated in the NAVAIR 
LOA.  The SH60 Free category assumes that some other agency pays these costs on 
NATO’s behalf resulting in zero initial cost to NATO for the acceptance of fully 
operational SH60s.  If another arrangement were made wherein NATO was responsible 
for a portion of the startup costs, then the same methodology should be used with the SH-
60 purchase price adjusted as appropriate to reflect NATO’s initial costs. 
A. PURCHASE PRICE, ANNUAL COST, AND LIFE CYCLE COST 
OVERVIEW 
The initial purchase price, annual costs, and life cycle costs of the various options 
differ significantly.  To date, the focus of NATO stakeholders appears to be in keeping 
the initial procurement cost near zero.  This would enable a more rapid acquisition of 
helicopters, thereby expediting the process of standing up the SOF rotary air capability.  
However, the SH-60 has significantly higher O&S costs per flight hour than the 
LAKOTA.  Therefore, even with potentially zero procurement cost for the SH-60s, they 
may still be more expensive, depending upon how long the program endures.  Three 
scenarios will be discussed to illustrate the range of financial options.  First, NATO could 
acquire EDA SH-60s from the U.S., and maintain them for the duration of the program.  
Second, NATO could forego the EDA SH-60s and procure and operate LAKOTAs at the 
outset.  Third, NATO could initially acquire EDA SH-60s to get the program started, and 
then replace them with LAKOTAs as funds become available.  Since the lump-sum 
procurement costs (i.e., single-year cost) of new helicopters would be the primary 
obstacle in this scenario, the new helicopters could be phased in over a few years to 
minimize costs in any one year.  Program duration has not yet been determined.  Some at 
NATO have suggested the program may only last until 2019.  Therefore, this analysis 
will consider a potential 2019 end date, and a twenty-year cost determination.  Operation 
and Support costs per annum are based upon an assumption of 250 flight hours per 
platform per year. 
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B. SH60 COSTED OPTION 
With the high O&S costs of the SH-60, any significant initial costs of 
procurement make the SH-60s much more expensive in the long term.  The SH-60 
Costed model, based upon the full program start-up estimate delineated in the NAVAIR 
LOA, has extremely high costs as presented in Table 6.  Significant amounts of the O&S 
costs for the first two years are included in the LOA bottom line price.  Therefore, this 
estimate uses the bottom line price (adjusted for inflation) from the  NAVAIR LOA, adds 
only fuel costs for the first two year’s O&S, and uses full O&S estimates for the 
following years. 
Table 6. Annual Cost of Full Program Startup using EDA SH-60s (BY2011) 
SH60 FULL COST MODEL 
Year 1 $105,825,852 
Year 2 $531,000 
Year 3 and After $8,562,000 
 
 These are used airframes, and are not expected to have twenty years of service life 
remaining.  Therefore, the cumulative acquisition and O&S costs will only be projected 
to 2019.  The price of acquiring replacement EDA SH-60s at the price level of the Costed 
model would be prohibitive.  Also, estimation of this seven-year period will suffice to 
illustrate the high costs of this option as presented in Figure 6.   
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Accepting that price is the primary consideration in determining which alternative 
to pursue, the Costed model for EDA SH-60s is not recommended.  It is far more 
expensive initially and cumulatively than the procurement of Commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) LAKOTA aircraft.  Having shown the prohibitive costs of this option, no further 
analysis of it will be made.  The following analysis will compare only the potential zero-
cost SH-60 option with the COTS LAKOTA. 
C. SH60 FREE AND LAKOTA 20-YEAR COST COMPARISON 
Extending costs over a twenty year period for free SH-60s and LAKOTAs using 
the dollar values in Table 5, we arrive at the annual costs listed in Table 7, and 
cumulative costs presented in Figure 7. 
Table 7. Annual Costs 
  LAKOTA SH60 Free 
Year 1 $38,734,500 $8,562,000 
Year 2 and After $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
 
 
Figure 7.   20-Year Cumulative Costs 
 The cumulative costs are significantly less for the LAKOTA than the SH-60 over 
a 20-year period because of the different O&S costs.  However, the initial procurement 
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sufficient quantities to purchase six LAKOTAs in year one, then the best way forward 
may be acceptance of the free SH-60s with subsequent replacement by LAKOTAs as 
funds become available.  Two illustrative options for such phased replacement are 
presented below and compared to the options of either maintaining only the free SH-60s 
or purchasing six LAKOTAs in year one.  They are: 
• Rapid Replacement: Acceptance of six free SH-60s in 2013 with 
replacement by two LAKOTAs per year beginning in 2014;  Annual Costs 
are presented in Table 8 and cumulative costs are presented in Figure 8. 
• Gradual Replacement: Acceptance of six free SH-60s in 2013 with 
replacement by one LAKOTA per year beginning in 2015; Annual Costs 
are presented in Table 9 and cumulative costs are presented in Figure 9. 
Table 8. Rapid Replacement: Two LAKOTAs/year beginning 2014 
Year 
2/yr begin 
2014 
   LAKOTA 
       Only 
SH60 Free 
Only 
2013 $8,562,000 $38,734,500 $8,562,000 
2014 $18,619,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2015 $17,160,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2016 $15,700,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2017 and After $4,183,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
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Figure 8.   Cumulative Cost of Six EDA 60s Followed by LAKOTA Replacement at a 
Rate of Two Aircraft Per Year 
The Rapid Replacement schedule has a cumulative twenty year cost of 
$126,978,000 versus $118,221,000 for the LAKOTA only option and $171,240,000 for 
the SH60 free only option.  Though more expensive cumulatively than the LAKOTA 
only option, its highest cost in any one year is just $18,619,500, less than half of the 
$38,734,500 first year cost of the LAKOTA-only option. 
Table 9. Gradual Replacement: One LAKOTA/year beginning 2015  
Year 
1/yr begin 
2015 
Only 
LAKOTA Only SH60 Free 
2013 $8,562,000 $38,734,500 $8,562,000 
2014 $8,562,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2015 $13,590,750 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2016 $12,861,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2017 $12,131,250 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2018 $11,401,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2019 $10,671,750 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2020 $9,942,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2021 and After $4,183,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
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Figure 9.   Cumulative Cost of Six EDA 60s Followed by LAKOTA Replacement at a 
Rate of One Aircraft Per Year 
The gradual replacement schedule delays procurement expenses and flattens 
annual costs by spreading purchases out even further.  It does so at the expense of higher 
cumulative costs (since more SH-60s would be operated for a longer duration).  The 
gradual replacement schedule has a cumulative 20-year cost of $137,924,250 versus 
$118,221,000 for the LAKOTA only option, $171,240,000 for the SH60 free only option, 
and $126,978,000 for the rapid replacement option.  Its highest cost in any one year is 
only $13,590,750 versus $18,619,500 for the rapid replacement option and the 
$38,734,500 first year cost of the LAKOTA-only option. 
D. COSTS CONSIDERED WITH A PROGRAM END DATE OF 2019 
As illustrated in Figure 9, with a program start date of 2013, the cumulative costs 
of the SH-60 free only option would be less than the LAKOTA-only option until 2020, at 
which point the higher O&S costs of the SH-60 offset their zero procurement costs.  
Estimates of cumulative costs through 2019 are $63,835,500 for the LAKOTA-only 
option and $59,934,000 for free SH-60s, a difference of $3,901,500.  LAKOTAs 
maintained under the CLS contract would have residual commercial sale value that would 
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adjust these figures moderately.  If the then seven-year-old helicopters could be resold for 
just $650,250 each, the total costs of the LAKOTA only and SH-60 free only options 
would be identical.  This seems a reasonable estimate of the LAKOTA’s residual value, 
so 2019 is the estimated break-even year for the LAKOTA only and SH-60 free only 
options.  The break-even year for phased replacement options would be even later, so 
replacing SH-60s with LAKOTAs is not a recommended option if a firm program end 
date of 2019 is likely.   
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V. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. PLATFORMS 
 In 2005, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center 
completed an AoA study for the DoD to replace the Army’s aging Vietnam-era LUH 
OH-58A/C and their UH-1H/V fleet.  As defined by the Army, the requirements for the 
LUH program called for a lightweight, low cost helicopter capable of providing reliable, 
general support at affordable life-cycle cost.76 Using the UH-60 to conduct the LUH 
mission was deemed cost prohibitive and in 2005 the Joint Requirement Oversight 
Council (JROC) offered the following guidance. 
A need exists for a helicopter that can provide reliable and sustainable 
general support and administrative support in permissive environments at 
reduced acquisition and operating and support costs.  Program guidance is 
that acquisition cost and operating and support cost must be less than the 
current Army utility helicopter (UH-60).77 
TRADOC’s AoA included extensive analysis of 35 COTS/Non-Developmental-
Item (NDI) aircraft alternatives.  The list of 35 possible airframes was reduced to 11 
based upon an acquisition price-ceiling target of $6 Million per aircraft.  For the 
qualitative assessment, TRADOC employed a survey group consisting of six Active Duty 
pilots, six Active Duty National Guard pilots, 1 Reservist, 3 Retired, and 1 other, which 
together gave a combined total of 206.5 years and 29,998 flight hours of LUH 
experience.78  The survey requested the LUH community members to rank 30 LUH 
attributes with respect to four different mission types. The AoA then conducted a 
performance and cost integration analysis to determine the “Best Value” selection. The 
combined financial and qualitative assessments led to their selection of the LAKOTA as 
the single platform solution to the Army’s LUH requirement.79 
                                                 
76 Morris G. Hayes et al,. Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) Analysis of Alternatives (Fort Lee, VA; 
TRADOC, 2005). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
 44 
The capabilities sought by the Army for their LUH program were very similar to 
those sought by NSHQ.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that two of the final aircraft 
considered by the Army were the UH-60 and the LAKOTA, as their equivalent aircraft 
(the SH-60 and EC-145) are also on the short-list for consideration by NSHQ.  Figure 10, 
below, shows 16 key attributes from the Army’s LUH Capabilities Development 
Document (CDD) that have commonality with NSHQ’s mission requirements. 
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Figure 10.   LUH Attributes80 
                                                 
80 Morris G. Hayes et al,. Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) Analysis of Alternatives (Fort Lee, VA; 
TRADOC, 2005), 20–24. 
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The SH-60 is also capable of handling all of NSHQ’s requirements; however, 
they are more expensive to operate and would require a more expansive organic logistical 
footprint when compared to the CLS option associated with the LAKOTA.  Though the 
UH-60 was found to exceed the LAKOTA in certain capabilities, weighing cost versus 
performance, the UH-60F performance gains were considered to be negligible.81  NSHQ 
shares the Army’s focus on cost effectiveness.  The Army’s selection of the cost effective 
LAKOTA over the UH-60 suggests NSHQ should also seriously consider the LAKOTA 
for their fundamentally similar performance requirements.    
B. CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
When conducting life cycle cost analysis, operation and sustainment can account 
for 60–75% of life cycle support costs.82  Realizing this, DoD has pursued measures to 
reduce operation and sustainment costs for its programs.  One measure that has been 
taken is to replace organic logistics support personnel and infrastructure with contracted 
logistics support.  In many instances, industry can perform required logistics support 
functions less expensively than government, simultaneously easing government 
manpower requirements and speeding program implementation.  The Defense 
Acquisition University defines contractor logistics support as, “The performance of 
maintenance and/or materiel management functions for a DoD system by a commercial 
activity. Current policy allows for the provision of system support by contractors on a 
long-term basis.”83 
Three logistics’ metrics are central to the measurement and assessment of 
operation and sustainment program efficacy.  These metrics are mission reliability, mean 
time to repair, and operational availability.  Mission reliability is, “The probability that a  
 
                                                 
81 Morris G. Hayes et al,. Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) Analysis of Alternatives (Fort Lee, VA; 
TRADOC, 2005). 
82 Department of Defense, DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assessment 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2009). 
83 Defense Acquisition University (U.S.), Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 14th 
ed. (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2011). 
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system will perform its required mission-critical functions for the duration of a specified 
mission under conditions stated in the mission profile.”84  Mean time to repair (MTTR) 
is:  
The total elapsed time (clock hours) for corrective maintenance divided by 
the total number of corrective maintenance actions during a given period. 
A basic technical measure of maintainability recommended for use in the 
research and development (R&D) contractual specification environment, 
where “time” and “repair” must be carefully defined for contractual 
compliance purposes.85 
Operational Availability is:  
The degree (expressed as a decimal between 0 and 1, or the percentage 
equivalent) to which one can expect a piece of equipment or weapon 
system to work properly when it is required—or, the percent of time the 
equipment or weapon system is available for use.86 
The Light Utility Helicopter program administered by the United States Army 
uses a firm fixed price contract to stipulate the following requirements: 
1. 90% mission reliability threshold with a 95% mission reliability objective. 
2. A mean time to repair (MTTR) threshold of two hours, and objective of 
one hour.   
3. An Operational Availability threshold of 80% with a 90% objective. 
The acquisition strategy for the Light Utility program asserts that primary 
sustainment will be through contractor logistics support.  Tables 10 and 11 show the 
Operational Availability achieved through hybrid and full CLS.   
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Defense Acquisition University (U.S.), Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 14th 
ed. (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2011). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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Table 10. Hybrid CLS Performance87 
 
Table 11. Full CLS Performance88 
 
Contractor logistics support is beneficial in that it allows for the use of original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) and commercial best practices.  Under the U.S. Army’s 
program, Sikorsky (the OEM), conducts full maintenance support for the LUH.  This 
provides highly trained, platform specific maintainers with a comprehensive 
understanding of the airframe, its capabilities, limitations, and maintenance requirements, 
that is difficult to replicate with DoD organic maintenance personnel.  The CLS contract 
also allows for single source parts requisition, which improves MTTR through a 
streamlined and professionally managed transportation pipeline.  Additionally, the 
government is able to capitalize on commercial sector economies of scale if the OEM 
owns the entire supply chain.89  Furthermore, the CLS environment provides a high 
continuity of maintenance personnel when compared to the Department of Defense, 
where service members transfer frequently.  This continuity of support personnel 
                                                 
87 “UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter” (presentation, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, 
Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011) 
88 “UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter” (presentation, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, 
Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011) 
89 Michael Boito, Cynthia R. Cook and John C. Graser, Contractor Logistics Support in the U.S. Air 
Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, [2009]). 
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improves maintenance program efficacy by reducing the cyclical learning curve 
inefficiencies characteristic of organically operated military maintenance programs. 
The utilization of CLS has the potential to entirely eliminate the need for NSHQ 
to establish its own maintenance wing, depending upon the type of CLS contract 
established.  Under a Full CLS Performance contract, the responsibility to man, train, and 
equip the maintainers is the sole responsibility of the contractor.  It would eliminate the 
need for NSHQ to establish support infrastructure such as warehousing, billeting, and 
maintenance facilities.  Furthermore, NATO participating nations would avoid the 
personnel lifecycle costs of recruiting, training, and supporting additional service 
members for their career and beyond.  The counterpoint to these arguments is that 
organic maintenance would give NSHQ the maximum amount of control over 
maintenance.  Additionally, NSHQ would directly benefit from any efficiency gained 
throughout the program lifecycle.  Organic maintenance also improves the deployability 
of maintenance personnel to the possible range of semi-permissive and hostile 
environments.  Deployability of contracted maintainers can be structured into the 
contract, but will still lack the complete flexibility of organic military personnel. 
In an interesting subset of the Army’s LUH program, there is a hybrid CLS 
approach being used in the Army National Guard (see Figure 10).  This hybrid CLS 
contract provides some benefits of both organic and CLS sustainment.  In this 
arrangement, the maintenance and logistics supply chain is still managed by the 
contractor with the exception of the field level aircraft maintenance person (i.e., the 
person turning the wrench), who is a military member.  All other maintenance, including 
depot maintenance, is conducted exclusively with contractor personnel.  Using contracted 
personnel for depot level maintenance retains many of the benefits associated with 
commercial best practices; while the use of military personnel for field level maintenance 
enables the full flexibility of deployment options if required. 
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Figure 11.   U.S. Army Hybrid CLS Work Structure for the LUH90 
 If NSHQ decides to use CLS, there is the potential for additional benefits and 
flexibility beyond that achieved by the U.S. Army.  U.S. DoD works under the following 
constraints which would not be applicable to NATO: 
• Title 10 USC 2466 which requires that 50 percent of depot level 
maintenance be conducted by organic government organizations 
• Title 10 USC 2464 which requires that the government determine which 
logistics capabilities are “core” and these must be owned and operated by 
the government. 
The determining factor for NSHQ on whether or not to use CLS may be the 
amount of control it would like to exercise over the maintenance process.  Accordingly, 
there are two underlying factors that are critical in determining the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of decreased control of program maintenance.  These factors are 
complexity/uncertainty and knowledge/understanding.91  As the complexity and 
uncertainty of service delivery decreases, the activity requesting CLS can comfortably 
exercise less control over sustainment procedures.  Using a CLS package with a proven 
                                                 
90 “UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter” (presentation, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, 
Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011). 
91 Wendell C. Lawther, Contracting for the 21st Century a Partnership Model (Arlington, VA: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002). 
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successful performance history like the program administered by the Army, helps to 
mitigate these concerns.  Additionally, the level of aircraft maintenance 
knowledge/expertise organically available in NSHQ is a contributing determinant.  If 
NSHQ has the ability to easily source and assign competent military maintenance and 
logistics support personnel to the program, then the benefit of CLS is lessened.  However, 
if maintenance/logistics personnel and infrastructure establishment is a concern, then 
CLS offers a simple solution.  Training and knowledge transfer is another consideration.  
If NSHQ wants to train member nation maintenance personnel, it might favor a hybrid 
CLS arrangement whereby contractors would instruct a maintenance curriculum.  
However, if the intent is purely to have a platform with which to train pilots, it might be 
preferable to completely remove the requirement for NSHQ to conduct or manage 
maintenance, with the exception of a contracting officer’s representative to advise the 
contracting office if the terms and conditions of the contract are being met.  Under the 
U.S. Army’s contract, there is a firm fixed price per flight hour. 
A final point to be made about the LUH CLS is the airframe worthiness 
certificate.  In addition to the previously mentioned benefits of OEM CLS, the OEM has 
the proper training and certification to maintain the aircraft in accordance with Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.  This provides additional options for 
demilitarization and disposal when the NSHQ rotary training wing mission is complete.  
Since the aircraft have been maintained within FAA standards, they can easily be resold 
in the commercial sector when the military no longer requires them.   
C. THE MI-17 (EXPORT VERSION OF THE MI-8 HIP) 
 The MI-17 is a Russian made aircraft currently being produced at facilities in 
Kazan and Ulan-Ude.  It is a ubiquitous aircraft around the world and is used by some 
newer NATO member nations in Eastern Europe.92  Since it is flown by a number of 
NATO nations, its inclusion in the NATO SOF rotary wing could be beneficial in 
training and skill transfer.  Conducting SOF training in the same airframe that 
participants will fly upon return to their home country would maximize the effectiveness 
                                                 
92 Joris Janssen Lok, “MI-17 Upgrade Aims to Fill NATO Helo Gap.” Aviation Week, March 23, 
2008. 
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of skill transfer to those participating nations.  However, reliable cost/price data was 
difficult to acquire.  Kazan helicopters did not respond to requests for price information.  
Honeywell International, a U.S. based conglomerate, teamed with LOM Praha from the 
Czech Republic to provide MI-17 logistics support.93  However, Honeywell also did not 
respond to requests for pricing data.  Attempts to obtain procurement, operation and 
support data from the U.S. military were also unsuccessful.  With the lack of reliable 
pricing data, the decision was made to exclude the MI-17 from quantitative analysis.  
However, a number of issues were discovered during initial research of the airframe that 
may be useful for consideration in any subsequent analysis of the MI-17 for procurement 
and operation. 
 The MI-17 is considered to be a low-cost, capable medium lift aircraft.  However, 
the increased demand for these airframes has driven up costs in recent years.94  The 2001 
price for refurbished M-17s was between $1.2 million and $1.7 million, while new MI-
17s sold for $3 million.  By 2009, vendors were quoting $7.5 million for new MI-17s.  
However, the U.S. paid between $13 and $16 million per aircraft when purchasing MI-
17s for Iraq,95 and approximately $20 million per aircraft for Afghanistan.96  Lest this 
cost inflation be considered unique to U.S. DoD acquisition processes, the Indian military 
recently experienced a similar sticker shock.  The Indian Air Force (IAF) purchased eight 
MI-17v5s in 2008 that were delivered in 2011 for a cost of $16.75 million per 
helicopter,97 this price was roughly double the price originally quoted in 2006 of $8.275 
million per aircraft.98 
 Purchasing used/refurbished aircraft can be significantly less expensive for initial 
procurement, but that too, presents certain risks.  The maintenance history and records of 
                                                 
93 Shephard News Team, “Czech Republic: Honeywell and LOM PRAHA Announce Teaming 
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used MI-17s can be difficult to verify.  Recently, Iraq purchased used MI-17s from a 
Polish company.  Upon receipt, they discovered that the helicopters were either beyond 
their service life or uneconomical to refurbish and overhaul.99  The older models that are 
more economical to procure are also less capable, having less powerful engines that limit 
their ability to operate in some environments.  The newer versions are highly sought for 
their ability to operate in high and hot environments like those found in Afghanistan, and 
as a result, are simply unavailable on the pre-owned market.100  An additional concern is 
that MI-17s are made to meet Russian airworthiness certifications, rather than U.S. FAA 
or European EASA standards.  Acceptance (or not) of Russian airworthiness certification 
is a consideration, though the Russian certificate has been accepted by the U.S. Army for 
their program management.101  
 The U.S. Army originally procured MI-17s through Kazan Helicopters, and then 
contracted for Return to Service (RTS) modifications in the UAE to militarize the aircraft 
and bring them into airworthiness standards equivalent to other Army aviation platforms.  
This same RTS program was utilized when used MI-17s were donated to Afghanistan 
from other countries.102  This represents added financial and administrative burden.  
However, in 2010, the Russian Federation notified DoD that purchasing commercial 
Russian aircraft for subsequent military modification violated Russian Law.  Government 
intervention was required to facilitate an agreement to purchase from the Russian 
Federation.  This eliminated the need for the RTS program and changed the procurement 
from commercial to foreign military sales.103  This type of arrangement has political 
implications and complications that must be considered from NATO’s perspective. 
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 An additional consideration is that, as a medium lift aircraft, the MI-17 is 
significantly larger than the SH-60 or the EC-145.  The positive side of this is the ability 
to move significantly more passengers.  The downside is that some O&S costs will be 
higher, particularly fuel (though exact data was not found). 
Though reliable O&S costs were not found, based upon the open source 
information discussed above, using solely MI-17s would be significantly more expensive 
than free SH-60s or LAKOTAs based solely upon procurement and retrofit costs.  The 
O&S costs are unlikely to improve this, and may result in even higher comparative costs.  
Though a wing of MI-17s does not appear desirable from an administrative standpoint or 
feasible from a financial standpoint, it might be beneficial to the goals of training and 
skill transfer (especially for certain Eastern European member nation personnel) to have 
an MI-17 for SOF training.  If the benefit to skill transfer is deemed sufficient perhaps 
purchasing a single refurbished aircraft for training of those particular SOF personnel 
could be worthwhile.  This is a potential area for further research.   
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VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The LAKOTA (militarized variant of the EC-145) is a capable general purpose 
helicopter that meets the operational requirements of NSHQ.  A LAKOTA program can 
be rapidly initiated, since the aircraft are available commercially. Conversely, SH-60s 
would require potentially expensive and time-consuming overhaul and testing to be made 
fully operational.  LAKOTAs are also more cost effective than SH-60s in almost every 
possible scenario.   
• The cost of EDA SH-60s will be more than double the cost of LAKOTAs 
if NSHQ is responsible for all of the SH-60 EDA associated costs of 
refurbishment, repair, transportation, and program development 
(comparable to the NAVAIR grant delineated in the Appendix). 
• The cost of EDA SH-60s will still exceed the cost of LAKOTAs if NSHQ 
is responsible for any (even a small portion) of the EDA grant associated 
costs mentioned above. 
• Even if there is zero cost to NATO for EDA SH-60 acquisition, they will 
still be more expensive than LAKOTAs if the program extends beyond 
2019, because of the higher O&S costs of the SH-60.  
• For SH-60s to be equivalent in cost to LAKOTAs, there must be zero cost 
to NATO for acquisition, and the program must end in 2019.  Even if this 
is considered likely, procurement of LAKOTAs may still be preferable, as 
it provides the flexibility of extending the program without any significant 
additional costs. 
Factors other than cost also favor the LAKOTA.  Establishing a wing of SH-60s 
would require an extensive organic maintenance and logistics footprint with significant 
associated costs and managerial complexity for facilities, parts support, manning, etc.  
Conversely, the LAKOTA’s available CLS package would eliminate the requirement for 
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NSHQ to establish any organic maintenance and logistics capacity at all.  This would 
make program establishment and administration dramatically less complex, by providing 
NATO a simple turn-key aircraft operation, requiring only pilots and flight crew. 
If the one-time procurement expense for six LAKOTAs were prohibitive, then a 
gradual replacement of SH-60s by LAKOTAs would still be likely to generate some 
savings, when compared to a pure SH-60 program.  In this scenario, program duration 
would be a factor.   Financial analysis using the procedure delineated in the quantitative 
section of this project would be required to determine the most cost-effective solution.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
NSHQ should investigate options for LAKOTA procurement prior to seeking an 
EDA SH-60 grant from the U.S. DoD.  NSHQ should contact EADS to determine if a 
cost-effective solution meeting NSHQ requirements could be negotiated.  This could 
dramatically ease NSHQ’s efforts in developing their program.  It may also be possible 
for NSHQ to work out an arrangement with the U.S. Army, to leverage their existing 
LAKOTA contract for six additional helicopters.  This will require direct liaison with the 
U.S. Army LUH program management to determine if it is practicable.  Even if an 
acceptable agreement is not made with EADS or the U.S. Army, the cost-effectiveness of 
the Army’s LUH program suggests that further market research into COTS aircraft is 
warranted, prior to accepting an EDA grant of SH-60s. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Consideration should be given to the utility of having an MI-17 available to 
NSHQ.  Having even one aircraft may be beneficial.  It would improve training and skill 
transfer effectiveness for Eastern European member nation personnel by enabling them to 
train on an airframe that they are likely to operate after their tour with NSHQ.  Cost, 
complexity, and program risk will need to be researched, analyzed and balanced against 
the likely benefits.    
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APPENDIX. NAVAIR SH-60 COST ESTIMATES 
 
 58 
 
 59 
 
 60 
 
 61 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 
 64 
 
 65 
 
 66 
 
 67 
 
 68 
 
 69 
 
 70 
 
 71 
 
 72 
 
 73 
 
 74 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“Army Weapons and Equipment: Aircraft,” Army Magazine 60, no. 10 (October 2010).  
Biscop, Sven, Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, Daniel Keohane, Stefano Silvestri, and 
Teija Tiilikainen. What do Europeans Want from NATO? Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2010. 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/what-do-europeans-want-
from-nato/. 
Boito, Michael, Cynthia R. Cook, and John C. Graser. Contractor Logistics Support in 
the U.S. Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG779.pdf. 
Chivvis, Christopher. Recasting NATO's Strategic Concept Possible Directions for the 
United States. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP280.pdf. 
Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations. Legislation 
on Foreign Relations through 2002. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2003. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf. 
Cuccia, Phillip R. Implications of a Changing NATO. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010. 
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval, s.v. “LUH,” last updated 
December 31, 2010. https://ebiz.acq.osd.mil/damir 
Defense Acquisition University (U.S.). Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and 
Terms, 14th ed. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2011. 
https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/pages/Default.aspx. 
Department of Defense. DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support 
Assessment. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2009. https://acc.dau.mil/psa. 
Drwiega, Andrew. Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft: Aiding the Transition. Rotor and 
Wing, October 1, 2011.  
http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/military/attack/74442.html. 
Federation of American Scientists, “SH-60 LAMPS MK III Seahawk,” last modified 
December 27, 1999, accessed March 3, 2012. http://www.fas.org/man//dod-
101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm 
 
 76 
Haddick, Robert. This Week at War: Europe Powers Down. Foreign Policy, November 4, 
2011.  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/04/ 
this_week_at_war_europe_powers_down?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=f
ull. 
“India to Buy 80 Mi-17v5 Helicopters.” Defense Industry Daily, December 10, 2008.  
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/india-to-buy-80-mi17-1v-helicopters-
02755/. 
Indo-Asian News Service. “India to Induct Latest Russian Military Chopper Mi-17V5.” 
The Economic Times, February 16, 2012.  
Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, s.v. “Sikorsky S-70B,” accessed February 29, 2012. 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/conte
nt1/janesdata/yb/jawa/jawa1458.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword
=Sikorsky S-
70B&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JAWA& 
Lawther, Wendell C. Contracting for the 21st Century a Partnership Model. Arlington, 
VA: PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2002. 
Lok, Joris Janssen. “MI-17 Upgrade Aims to Fill NATO Helo Gap.” Aviation Week, 
March 23, 2008.  
———. “Rotary Imbalance.” Aviation Week 26, November, 32. 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters. DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept 
for Development & Organisation. SHAPE, Belgium: NATO, 2010. 
NATO. Allied Command Transformation. Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Towards 
2030: Final Report, 2009a. http://www.act.nato.int/mfp-documents. 
———. Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Towards 2030: Findings and 
Recommendations. Belgium:NATO, 2009b. http://www.act.nato.int/mfp-
documents. 
Newton, Richard D. Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future. 
Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006. 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/docrepository/JSOU_Report_06_8.pdf. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Active Engagement, Modern Defence : Strategic 
Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation : Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. Belgium: 
NATO, 2010. 
———. Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5. Belgium: NATO, 2009. 
 77 
———. “Backgrounder: Interoperability for Joint Operations.” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/html_en/interoperability01.html 
(accessed December 2, 2011). 
———. Guidelines for NATO SOF Helicopter Operations. SHAPE, Belgium: NATO 
Special Operations Headquarters, 2011. 
———. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study. 
SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC), 2008. 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSHQ/GetFile/?File_ID=29. 
———. Special Air Warfare Manual. Version 1.0. SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Special 
Operations Headquarters, 2010. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Public Diplomacy Division. NATO 2020: Assured 
Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendation of the Group of 
Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division, 2010. http://www.nato.int/strategic-
concept/expertsreport.pdf. 
Pyadushkin, Maxim. “Strong Mi-17 Demand Boosts Prices.” Aviation Week, September 
21, 2010.  http://web02.aviationweek.com/aw/mstory.do?id=news/asd/ 
2010/09/21/11.xml&channel=defense&headline=Strong%20Mi-
17%20Demand%20Boosts%20Prices. 
Shephard News Team. “Czech Republic: Honeywell and LOM PRAHA Announce 
Teaming Agreement for Helicopter Maintenance Services.” Rotorhub, September 
9, 2008.  http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/rotorhub/czech-republic-
honeywell-and-lom-praha-a/. 
“UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter,” presentation, Aviation Applied Technology 
Directorate, Ft. Eustis, VA, November 8, 2011 
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Congressional Budget 
Justification: Foreign Assistance: Title IV Supporting Information, 2007. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102658.pdf. 
United States Special Operations Command. Initial Capabilities Document for North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Air Warfare Center. Tampa, FL: 
United States Special Operations Command, 2012. 
“U.S. Equipping Afghan Army with Russian-Built Mi-17.” US Fed News Service, 
September 22, 2011.  
Weinberger, Sharon. “Problems for U.S. Russian Helicopter Order.” Aviation Week, June 
1, 2009.  
 78 
Whitlock, Craig. “U.S. Military Criticized for Purchase of Russian Copters for Afghan 
Air Corps.” Washington Post, June 19, 2010. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR2010061805630.html. 
 
 79 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
 
 
 
